Abstract
We introduce a model of interacting random walkers on a finite
one-dimensional chain with absorbing boundaries or targets at the ends. Walkers
are of two types: informed particles that move ballistically towards a given
target, and diffusing uniformed particles that are biased towards close
informed particles. This model mimics the dynamics of animals searching for
food, where an informed individual knows the location of a food target and
tries to persuade close-by uninformed conspecifics to go to that target. We
characterize the success of this persuasion by the first-passage probability of
the uniformed particle to the target, and we interpret the speed of the
informed particle as a strategic parameter that the particle tunes to maximize
its success. We find that the success probability is non-monotonic, reaching
its maximum at an intermediate speed that increases with the diffusing rate of
the uniformed particle. When two different groups of informed particles
traveling in opposite directions compete, usually the largest group is the most
successful. However, the minority can reverse this situation and become the
most probable winner by following two different strategies: increasing its
attraction strength and adjusting its speed to an optimal value relative to the
majority's speed.
Users
Please
log in to take part in the discussion (add own reviews or comments).